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Federal Income Taxation: Validity of Deficiencies
Assessed Where Commissioner Fails
To Conform With Section 7605(b)
In 1957 taxpayers filed an application for a tentative net operating loss carryback to 1954 and 1955 which necessitated a second
examination of their books for those years by the Commissioner.'
Without the taxpayers' knowledge certain deductions allowed in
the prior years were also reconsidered and disallowed and a deficiency was assessed. The taxpayers contended that this assessment
was improper because it resulted from an inspection not conforming to requirements imposed by Section 7605(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. This section permits only one inspection for any taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise
or is notified by the Commissioner in writing that an additional
inspection is necessary.? A majority of the Tax Court held that
since taxpayers knew a second examination was being conducted
and failed to object until the result proved unfavorable, they had
waived the written notice otherwise required by section 7605(b).
M. 0. Rife, Jr., 41 T.C. 732 (1964). Five judges concurred on the
ground that the failure of the Commissioner to comply with the
provisions of section 7605(b), even if not waived, should not invalidate a deficiency assessment. Since it is well established that
the failure of a taxpayer to object to an investigation of which
he is aware constitutes a waiver of the requirements of section
7605(b),3 this Comment focuses upon the issues raised in the concurring opinion.
Section 7605(b) is a long-standing' limitation on the Commis1. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6411, no examination of a taxpayer's
books prior to the allowance of a tentative net operating loss carryback is contemplated. However, provision is made for an examination subsequent to such
allowance to determine the finality of the tentative adjustment.
2. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(b):
RESTRICTIONS ON EXAMINATION OF TAXPAYER.-No taxpayer shall
be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations, and only one
inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary
or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that
an additional inspection is necessary.
S. See, e.g., United States v. O'Connor, 287 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1956); United
States v. Young, 215 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Philip F. Flynn, 40 T.C.
770 (1963); J. S. McDonnell, 6 B.T.A. 685 (1927).
4. Section 7605(b) was originally enacted as the Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
186, § 1809, 42 Stat. 310.
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sioner's broad investigatory powers5 that was designed to protect
taxpayers from the harassment of repeated, unnecessary examinations of their books for the same tax year.6 The protection afforded
the taxpayer by section 7605(b) has received strict judicial construction. Although the taxpayer is entitled to resist examination
on any appropriate grounds without penalty7 and the Commissioner is not automatically entitled to court enforcement of
an order to produce records,' such enforcement is easily obtainable. Formerly the courts of appeals were divided on whether
the Commissioner was required to show probable cause to reexamine the taxpayer's books. However, in United States v.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 4§ 7601-06; see SA MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAxATIoN §§ 47.48, .51 (1964). See also Barnes, Inquisitorial Powers of the
Federal Government Relating to Taxes, 28 TAXEs 1211 (1950). The Supreme
Court recently outlined the scope of the Commissioner's power in United
States v. Powell, 85 Sup. Ct. 248, 255 (1964).
6. H.R. REP. No. 850, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1921); H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1926)
(conference committee report); 61 CONG. REC. 5855 (1921) (remarks of Senator
Penrose); 61 CONG. REc. 5202 (1921) (remarks of Representative Hawley). In
1926 the Senate passed a provision allowing two examinations for any tax
year and eliminating the power of the Commissioner to reexamine further upon
giving notice. Senator Reed argued that permitting the Commissioner to reexamine a taxpayer's books merely upon giving written notice of necessity afforded the taxpayer no protection. 67 CONG. REc. 8855-57 (1926). However the
House version, retaining the unlimited right of reexamination upon notice,
was finally reenacted. SEirMAN, LEGIsLATIvE HIsTORY OF FEDERAL INcoME
TAx LAWS 1988-1861, at 666 (1938).
7. The taxpayer may challenge the administrative summons when enforcement is sought under & 7604(a) and avoid the criminal sanctions of § 7210,
or he may challenge the summons when "an attachment . . . as for contempt"

is sought under § 7604(b). Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 447, 449 (1963).
8. In U.S. Aluminum Siding Corp. v. Eshleman, 170 F. Supp. 12 (N.D.
Ill. 1958), the Government contended that § 7605(b) required only written
notice and that the duty of the taxpayer to respond is automatically established with the service of this notice. Recognizing the split of authority discussed in note 9 infra, the court stated that all courts were agreed on one
thing -the taxpayer is entitled to contest the reexaminaion as unnecessary in
a court hearing and the "court is not required to give 'approval as a rubber
stamp upon the administrative subpoena without further investigation."' Id.
at 14. After carefully reviewing all the sections of the 1954 Code relating to
examinations (§§ 7601-06), the court concluded that the Commissioner's discretion is limited and subject to judicial review.
9. The majority of cases held that investigations were not "unnecessary"
even though facts indicating probable cause were not alleged. E.g., United
States v. Ryan, 820 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1963) (reasonable grounds for strong
suspicion based on net worth); Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148
(5th Cir. 1956) (allegations in affidavit of IRS officer sufficient); cf. Application of United States (Carroll), 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 855
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Powell,'o the Supreme Court recently decided that the Commissioner need show only that the proposed reexamination has a legitimate purpose, that he does not presently possess the information,
and that he has complied with the notice provisions of section
7605(b).n Thus, in Powell and a companion case, 2 evidence indicating that the Service had reason to suspect fraud, without any
showing of records or evidence upon which such suspicion was
based, was held to be sufficient to avoid the prohibition of "unnecessary examinations." 3 The Court said that while "Congress
recognized a need for a curb on the investigating powers of lowechelon revenue agents" and sought to encourage them to exercise
"prudent judgment" in performing their duties, it also "considered
that it met this need simply and fully by requiring such agents
to clear any repetitive examination with a superior."' 4
U.S. 857 (1957) (good discussion of the judicial concept of "necessity"). However, the Government did present some evidence in all these cases, even if
no more than the unsubstantiated testimony of a revenue agent. E.g., United
States v. Ryan, supra; Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, supra.
The minority view required the Commissioner to go forward with evidence
to show probable cause or reasonable grounds for suspicion (usually fraud)
in order to reexamine the records for a closed year. E.g., Lash v. Nighosian,
273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959) (determined by same test as applied to arrest
without warrant); O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958) (no
probable cause to reopen year barred by statute shown).
The O'Connor case, supra, bases its holding upon an excellent analysis of
the legislative history and purpose of § 7605(b). The court stated that if administrative determination by the IRS is sufficient to reopen years "closed"
by the statute of limitations, § 7605(b) "would be relegated to hardly more
than a pious exhortation directed to the tax authorities." Id. at 370. See 8A
MERTENs, op. cit. supra note 5,
47.48, at 134-35; Note, Taxation: Proof Required To Open a "Closed' Tax Year, 10 HASTINGs L.J. 211 (1958) (minority
view advocated as better rule).
For an excellent discussion and extensive citation of the law as viewed
in the circuits prior to 1964, see De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 88 n.28
(9th Cir. 1963).
10. 85 Sup. Ct. 248 (1964).
11. Id. at 255.
12. Ryan v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 232 (1964).
13. Three Justices dissented in Powell, stating that an examination of
years barred by the statute of limitations is presumptively "unnecessary"
under § 7605(b), and that the presumption must be overcome by a showing
of probable cause. They urged that the district court should require a showing
that the Service was not acting capriciously before compelling the production
of records for a closed year. 85 Sup. Ct. at 256. However, two of the dissenters
in Powell joined the majority in Ryan, finding that the testimony of the agent
was sufficient to show that the Government was not acting capriciously. One
Justice dissented on the basis of the dissent in Powell. 85 Sup. Ct. at 283-34.
14. 85 Sup. Ct. at 254; see note 6 supra.
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The status of a deficiency determined as a result of an improper
second examination is not treated in the Code. The only cases directly dealing with this question are Reineman-v. United States";
and Application of Leonardo.' In Reineman the taxpayers' books
and records for 1954 had been examined by a revenue agent. The
Government subsequently examined the taxpayers' books during
an investigation of their 1955 return. This examination resulted
in the disallowance of some 1954 deductions and the assessment
of a deficiency. The court found that the adjustments could have
been made only through a reexamination of the 1954 records.
Since the taxpayers were unaware that the 1954 books were to
be reexamined, they had not waived the protection of section
7605(b). It was held that since the written notice required by
section 7605(b) was not given, the deficiency assessment was void.
In Leonardo, as in Reineman, taxpayers' records were contained
in one set of ledgers and a reexamination of the "closed" years
was made without notice to the taxpayers in connection with a
legitimate examination of other years. Expressly following the
decision in Reineman, the Leonardo court suppressed the evidence thereby obtained in a criminal tax law prosecution.
The holdings of Reineman and Leonardo conflict with dicta
pronounced in a long series of cases,' 7 which held that the taxpayer had waived the protection of section 7605(b). In these cases
it was apparently assumed that section 7605(b) was not intended
to void deficiencies resulting from improper reexaminations.s The
Reineman court expressly refused to follow their view.'o The
Rife majority specifically left open its attitude toward the hold15. 301 Fad 267 (7th Cir. 1962).
16. 208 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
17. See, e.g., Blevins v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1956), affirming per curium 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 840, 843 (1955); Philip Mangone Co.
v. United States, 54 F.ed 168, 172 (Ct. Cl. 1931); Philip F. Flynn, 40 T.C.
770, 774 (1963); Executors of the Estate of George E. Barker, 18 B.T.A. 562,
566 (1928); J. S. McDonnell, 6 B.T.A. 685, 691, (1927).
18. The development of the doctrine that deficiencies discovered as a result
of a second examination made without the required notice are not void is an
interesting example of the construction of a rule of law without a sound
foundation. The dictum first appeared in J. S. McDonnell, 6 B.T.A. 685, 691
(1927), without discussion or elaboration. It was then picked up and repeated
in a series of cases, though never fully discussed by any court. Apparently it
was the generally accepted doctrine prior to the decision in Reineman. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(b); 6 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
5928.
19. 301 F.2d at 271-72. The court stated that the situation involved was
one of first impression and that no previous cases were in point.
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ings in Reineman and Leonardo. 0 The concurring judges asserted
that the oft-repeated dictum that "failure ... to comply. .. with
section 7605(b) .. . does not invalidate the deficiency. .. ." should
have the weight of precedent" and Reineman should be disapproved." Unfortunately, however, the concurring opinion does
not present a reasoned analysis of the relative merits of its posi20. The majority may have avoided considering Reineman and Leonardo
because of factual distinctions between those cases and the instant case in
addition to the finding of waiver. Unlike Reineman, the taxpayers in Rife
failed to show that the information used to determine their deficiency was
to be found only in their books and records, and in fact it appeared that such
information might well have been available elsewhere.
The application for allowance of a tentative earryback adjustment in the
instant case might be tantamount to a request for reexamination of the taxpayers' books. Or written notice of reexamination might be predicated upon
the taxpayers' signing of the tentative carryback allowance form, U.S. Treasury Dept. Form 1045. This form contains the printed statement "this allowance is a tentative adjustment pending an audit of the returns concerned."
The instant case might be distinguished from Leonardo (although not
Reineman) by the fact that Leonardo was a criminal prosecution in which
the burden of proof was on the Government. The majority in the instant case
stated that the holding in Leonardo was that evidence obtained by the unauthorized examination could not be used in a criminal prosecution. While
this is literally true, it is probably too narrow a reading since the Leonardo
court announced that it was following Reineman, a civil tax case.
Finally, in Reineman the facts forming the basis of the deficiency assessment were obtained by an improper reexamination while in the instant case
the facts were stipulated at trial. The taxpayers could object to the admission
in evidence of any stipulated fact only on the grounds of materiality and
relevancy. It would appear that by failing to object to the use of evidence
obtained by the second examination on these grounds, all rights to contest
the validity of a deficiency assessment based on such evidence could be considered waived. 41 T.C. 732, 750-51 n.6.
21. 41 T.C. at 751-52.
22. On numerous occasions the Tax Court has expressed unwillingness to
follow the decisions of the courts of appeals even where review of its decision
would lie in the court whose rule it rejects. E.g., Stacey Mfg. Co., 24 T.C. 703
(1955), rev'd, 237 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1956); Houston Farms Dev. Co., 15 T.C.
321 (1950), rev'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1952); see Muir, A Cottry Lawyer's Memorandum*Stare Decisis and the Tax Court, 44 A.B.A.J. 857
(1958); Comment, 9 STAm. L. REv. 827 (1957); 70 ILAv. L. Rnv. 1313 (1957).
This unwillingness to follow courts of appeals' decisions reflects a desire to
achieve uniform application of the tax laws. Arthur L. Lawrence, 97 T.C. 713,
718 (1957). Both the higher courts, e.g., Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d
46 (7th Cir. 1957); Stacey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605 (6th Cir.
1956), and legal commentators, e.g., Muir, supra, have been highly critical of
this attitude. Until Congress or the Supreme Court resolves the controversy
the Tax Court will apparently continue to decide cases before it according
to its own judgment.
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tion and the Reineman rule.
'The Supreme Court's recent Powell decision appears to support Reineman and casts doubt upon the concurring opinion in
the instant case. Since the Court emphasized the right of a taxpayer to contest a reexamination in a court hearing, it may logically be inferred that it would afford an appropriate remedy if the
Commissioner, by making a reexamination without notice, were
to deprive a taxpayer of the opportunity to have his rights adjudicated prior to that inspection. The only effective remedy is
voidance of any deficiency assessed as a result of the reexamination?"
The public interest in collecting taxes24 may on occasion conflict with the public interest in protecting taxpayers from harassment, much as the public interest in convicting criminals may,
in particular instances, run afoul of civil liberties. It is presently
unclear whether the settled rule rendering inadmissible evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution 5 applies by analogy to
require the voidance of deficiency assessments based upon evidence obtained by means of reexaminations of taxpayers' books
in violation of a statute?" The courts summarily rejected such
23. This reading of the Powell case is conjectural since the issue was not
before the Court. It should be noted that in Ryan v. United States, 85 Sup.
Ct. 232 (1964) (companion to Powell), the "necessity letter" was not sent to
the taxpayer and the district judge made no mention of this- probably
because counsel did not press the point. The Court specifically stated that
it would not interpret the necessity letter requirement of § 7605(b) since the
issue was not raised on appeal. 85 Sup. Ct. at 233.
24. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 784, 742 (5th Cir. 1953). Section
7605(b) should not be read to defeat this purpose. E.g., De Masters v. Arend,
318 F.2d 79, 86-87 (9th Cir. 1963); Application of United States (Carroll), 246
F.2d 762, 765 (2d Cir. 1957).
25. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (evidence obtained after arrest without probable cause); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(illegal search and seizure); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (coerced confession); Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 883 (1914) (illegal search
and seizure); United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (Sd Cir. 1957) (entrapment); see, e.g., Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and
Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 516-56 (1963); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large
in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 322.
26. Cf. United States v. Young, 215 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Mich. 1968). A
doctor kept two sets of books to facilitate a tax fraud. Certain records obtained by the Government as a result of an illegal search and seizure were
held to be the fruits of a violation of the taxpayer's constitutional rights
and were therefore suppressed. However, the bulk of the evidence consisted
of records which the taxpayer "voluntarily" (under pressure) handed over to
the tax authorities. The court held this to be a waiver of § 7605(b) and subsequently admitted the evidence, thus seemingly taking the position that
while constitutional guarantees should be jealously guarded, waiver of statutory rights may be freely recognized.

CASE COMMENT

1965]

595

an analogy in a number of older cases?' In the more recent civil
tax cases, such as the instant case and Reineman, they have
simply ignored the question.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) requires that property obtained by unlawful search and seizure be restored unless
otherwise subject to lawful detention, and prohibits its admission
into evidence. The Leonardo court refused to decide whether rule
41(e) excluded evidence obtained in violation of statute as well
as that seized unconstitutionally? However, on the basis of
analogy to rule 41(e), it did assert the power to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of section 7605(b)?2' This action was predicated on the "inherent disciplinary power" of the judiciary to
protect persons from illegal or improper acts by an officer of the
court in violation of a statute.
A reasonable distinction may exist between the violation of a
fundamental constitutional guarantee, which can result in the
deprivation of personal liberty, and the disregard of a statutory
protection, which can result only in the assessment of additional
income tax liability. The argument for the application of an exclusionary rule in dealing with violations of section 7605(b) is
nonetheless compelling. A taxpayer subject to civil penalties3 0
may also be criminally liable," and at the discretion of the Government, a civil inquiry may be changed to a criminal tax prosecution without notice. 2 Thus, a violation of the statutory protection of section 7605(b) may be comparable in result to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure.
27. See, e.g., Philip Mangone Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 168, 172 (Ct.
Cl. 1931); J. S. McDonnell, 6 B.T.A. 685, 691 (1927). In Philip Mangone the
court said, "The plaintiff likens the testimony . . . to testimony illegally
forced from defendants in criminal cases. We feel confident the analogy
is not sustainable ....

"

28. 208 F. Supp. at 126.
29. Id. at 127.
30. See IN. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7321-25 (forfeiture), 6211 (deficiency
assessments); 10 MERTENs, op. cit. supra, note 5, 3§ 55.02, .03, .08a, .09; 6
CCH 1964 STAND FED. TAX REP. 1 5520-75.
31. Felonies are punishable by imprisonment up to five years and fines
not more than $10,000, or both, and misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment of not more than one year and fines not more than $10,000, or both.
INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, M§ 7203-07; see 10 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 5, §
55A.01; 6 CCH 1964 STAND FE. TAX REP. 11 5701--25.
32. E.g., United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.ad 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1959);
United States v. Young, 215 F. Supp. 202, 203-04 (ED. Mich. 1963) (numerous cases cited). Contra, Application of Bodkin, 165 F. Supp. 25 (E.D.N.Y.
1958); United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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Even if a criminal prosecution is never brought, judicial failure
to void deficiency assessments resulting from noncompliance with
the statute would leave the taxpayer without remedy and encourage the Commissioner to continue his improper conduct.3
Courts have a duty to exercise their inherent disciplinary power
over public officials to protect persons brought before them from
the improper acts of such officials.
As the Supreme Court has stated in another context, "courts
can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly
and [only] through the medium of excluding evidence obtained
3
against those who frequently are guilty.""
Consequently the
courts ought to exclude evidence obtained through violation of
section 7605(b) whether a criminal prosecution or merely a civil
tax liability is involved.
The requirements established by Congress in section 7605(b)
are reasonable and impose no substantial burden upon the Commissioner in his efforts to collect taxes. The right of a taxpayer
to contest the necessity of a reexamination in a court hearing
does not afford protection against reexamination as such but
only from unfair investigations. If the Commissioner were allowed
to make enforceable deficiency assessments on the basis of information acquired in violation of section 7605(b), as suggested by
the concurring opinion in the instant case, the taxpayer would
be effectively deprived of his right to contest a reexamination.
Since circumstances do exist in which a reexamination can be
made without the taxpayer's knowledge, such a rule would be an
open invitation for the Commissioner to disregard section 7605(b)
whenever possible. However, by voiding deficiency assessments
based upon violations of section 7605(b), courts can ensure compliance with the statute.
33. Reineman v. United States, 301 F.2d 267, 271-72 (7th Cir. 1962).
34. E.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 844, 355 (1931);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390 (1919); Grant v.
United States, 282 F.2d 165, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Maresca,
266 Fed. 718, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); see 29 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 941, 944-45
(1961).
35. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting), quoted in Elkins v. United States, 864 U.S. 206, 218 (1959). In Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928), Mr. Justice Brandeis said in dissent: "In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.. . . If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
unto himself . . . ." Since that time there has been a progressive evolution

in the area of criminal law to insure that law enforcement officers strictly
comply with the law. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v.
United States, supra.

